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Vote Dilution and the Census Undercount: 
A State-by-State Remedy 
Christopher M. Taylor 
INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years the federal government conducts an official cen-
sus in an attempt to count every man, woman, and child in 
America. The quality of this enumeration is tremendously impor-
tant, for the census must be accurate if all members of our repre-
sentative democracy are to have an equal voice in the governmental 
process.1 For example, state legislatures use census figures in the 
construction of congressional districts, and if those figures misrep-
resent the true population, the voting power of citizens will vary 
from district to district. Despite the importance of numeric accu-
racy, the U.S. census has never produced a correct tally. Each of 
the twenty-one censuses conducted since the nation's founding has 
undercounted substantially the actual population.2 A random un-
dercount would not present a significant controversy because its im-
pact would diffuse evenly throughout the nation.3 But the actual 
undercount disproportionately affects identifiable groups and thus 
1. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention hoped to ensure the accuracy of the 
census by giving states the positive incentive of increased congressional representation com-
bined with the negative pressure of proportional direct taxation. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.") with U.S. 
CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion 
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."). Madison wrote: 
As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in 
a considerable degree, on the disposition ... of the States, it is of great importance that 
the States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their 
numbers. Were their share of representatives alone to be governed by this rule, they 
would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their 
share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to 
both objects, the States will have opposite interests which will control and balance each 
other and produce the requisite impartiality. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 340-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This small-
scale system of checks and balances may have dissuaded various states from tampering with 
their census reports, but it did not then and does not today guarantee an accurate census. 
2. See generally MARao J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENsus: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
(1988). The net undercount does not represent gross error but instead reflects the difference 
between erroneous enumerations and omissions. See Stephen E. Fienberg, The New York 
City Census Adjustment Trial: Witness for the Plaintiffs, 34 JuRIMETRics J, 65, 69 (1993). 
3. Such an undercount still would affect adversely municipalities that rely upon reaching 
a certain population threshold (e.g. one million) to become eligible for some federal pro-
grams. See City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D.NJ.1978); Arthur J. Maurice & 
Richard P. Nathan, The Census Undercount: Effects on Federal Aid to Cities, 11 URBAN 
AFFAIRS Q. 251, 265 (1982). 
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generates serious constitutional questions regarding the conse-
quences of this faulty enumeration. 
The differential undercount leads to inaccuracies in population-
based governmental functions such as congressional apportionment 
and redistricting,4 state apportionment and redistricting,s and the 
distribution of certain federal funds,6 and thus adversely affects un-
dercounted groups. Although census takers have failed consistently 
to avoid the differential undercount in their initial enumeration, 
statistical methods exist that would substantially correct census 
figures.7 The Secretary of Commerce, who oversees the census, 
however, has chosen not to make this adjustment. 
Efforts by affected groups to force the Secretary to reverse this 
decision have been rejected by two circuits that have held that 
plaintiffs do not have standing to sue the Secretary based on a claim 
of vote dilution.8 These circuits held that the claimed injury - une-
qual representation - springs from the state legislatures' in-
dependent decisions to use unadjusted census data in formulating 
election districts, rather than directly from the Secretary's failure to 
adjust the official census.9 In contrast, these plaintiffs generally do 
have standing to challenge the Secretary's decision when their al-
leged injury is a deprivation of federal funds. But because there is 
no fundamental right to receive federal funds, the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard of review applicable to ordinary administra-
tive decisions sufficiently shields the Secretary from judicial 
reversal.10 
One vote dilution suit against the Secretary, however, has met 
with some initial success. The Second Circuit, in City of New York 
v. United States Department of Commerce, 11 held that the trial court 
4. Congressional apportionment refers to the federal government's distribution of repre-
sentatives among the several states, and redistricting refers to the periodic intrastate process 
of a state legislature's dividing its state into congressional election districts. 
5. Apportionment in the state context generally describes the state constitution's alloca-
tion of state legislators among the people of the state, which in tum is effected by subsequent 
redistricting. 
6. See generally infra text accompanying notes 10, 79. 
7. See infra section I.C. 
8. See City of Detroit v. Franklin,4 F.3d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
1217 (1994); Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1416-19 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). An individual suffers from vote dilution when he votes in 
an election district whose population exceeds the population of another district. For exam-
ple, in a given state, if congressional district X has a population of 1000, each person's vote in 
X is "worth" 1/1000th of the total, whereas in congressional district Y, with a population of 
2000, each person's vote is "worth" l/2000th of the total. Voters in district Y, therefore, have 
proportionately less power than voters in district X - their votes have been diluted. 
9. See infra section II.A. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68, 93-95. This Note does not address claims of 
deprivation of federal funds resulting in the differential undercount. 
11. 34 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter NYC v. DOC IV], cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 
(1995). 
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should have applied equal protection analysis in its review of the 
Secretary's decision not to adjust the census. The Second Circuit 
predicated this position on its assertion that the census directly af-
fects voting rights and that the judiciary must subject actions that 
impair the exercise of such a fundamental right to strict scrutiny.12 
The logical structure of this decision, however, is suspect because 
the Second Circuit failed to state why the plaintiffs had standing to 
sue the Secretary or to explain fully its unusual application of equal 
protection analysis in this vote-dilution context. 
This Note argues that groups seeking to correct under-
representation caused by the differential undercount do not have 
standing to sue the Secretary of Commerce but that they can sue 
their state governments in an effort to force them to use the best 
population data available in the construction of congressional dis-
tricts. Part I details the deeply rooted character of the differential 
undercount, describes statistical means that could have been em-
ployed to adjust the 1990 census, and demonstrates that the ad-
justed count surpasses the official census as an accurate 
representation of the true population. Part II examines recent liti-
gation that has attempted to force the Secretary of Commerce to 
reverse his decision not to adjust the 1990 census and concludes 
that these efforts have failed because the plaintiffs suffered no in-
jury directly related to the Secretary's decision and therefore lacked 
standing to challenge it. Part III argues that plaintiffs can prevail in 
actions against their state governments by challenging their state's 
use of unadjusted figures for congressional redistricting. The 
Supreme Court has required states to use the "best population data 
available" when drawing congressional districts. Because the unad-
justed census no longer represents the "best population data avail-
able" for most Americans, states must use adjusted data. 
I. THE CENSUS AND THE DIFFERENTIAL UNDERCOUNT 
In order to solve the problem caused by the differential un-
dercount, it is necessary to understand the magnitude, complexity, 
and ramifications of that undercount. Accordingly, section I.A 
briefly places the undercount in its historical context and describes 
its broad outlines. Section I.B discusses and explains the Census 
Bureau's effort to adjust the census by means of the 1990 post-
enumeration survey (PBS) and a dual-system estimate (DSB) of 
population based on the 1990 PBS. Section I.C demonstrates that 
the adjusted census surpasses the official census in both numeric 
and distributive accuracy. 
12. See 34 F.3d at 1131. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on NYC v. DOC IV 
on January 10, 1996. 
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A. Pre-1990 Differential Undercount 
Thomas Jefferson, who led the first U.S. Census in 1790, recog-
nized the impossibility of accurately counting every single Ameri-
can. Nevertheless, the tally of 3.9 million,13 surprised Jefferson,14 
who attributed the undercount to a fear of population-linked taxes. 
Jefferson estimated an actual population of closer to 4.1 million,15 
and, while he may have overstated the case, few disagree that 
problems of administration and institutional capability caused cen-
sus takers to undercount the actual population. 
The problems in the eighteenth century centered on the massive 
task of individually polling an extremely large population with little 
centralized control or direction.16 Two hundred years later, the cen-
sus undercount stems from poverty, a lack of education, transitory 
residential patterns, language obstacles, and hostility toward gov-
emment.17 These factors tend to occur disproportionately in urban 
and minority communities.18 Consequently, the census consistently 
has produced a larger undercount of these populations than of 
more stable, homogeneous groups.19 
The Department of Commerce, which has overseen the Bureau 
of the Census since 1903,20 began documenting the undercount in 
1940, when it first determined that the undercount differentially af-
fected white and nonwhite populations to nonwhites' substantial 
disadvantage.21 In the years that followed, subsequent studies 
13. Report on Census (Oct. 24, 1791), in 22 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 227 
{Charles T. CUiien ed., 1986) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON]. See generally ANDERSON, 
supra note 2, at 241. 
14. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Aug. 23, 1791), in 22 PAPERS 
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 61, 62; see also Abby L. Jennis, Note, The Census Un· 
dercount: Issues of Adjustment, 18 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 381, 381-82 {1984). 
15. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Paul Jones (Aug. 31, 1791), in 22 PAPERS 
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 111. 
16. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
17. See Jennis, supra note 14, at 382 n.10. 
18. See, e.g., S. Gregory Lipton & Leo F. Estrada, Factors Associated with Undercount 
Rates in Los Angeles County, in BUREAU OF THE CENsus, 1993 REsEARCH CONFERENCE ON 
UNDERCOUNTED ETIOOC POPULATIONS 83 (1993); see also Manuel de la Puente, Why Are 
People Missed or E"oneously Included by the Census: A Summary of Findings from Ethno-
graphic Coverage Reports, in BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra, at 29; Nathan Judish & Julia E. 
Judish, Falling Through the Cracks: Voting Rights and the Census-City of New York v. 
United States Department of Commerce, 34F.3d1114 (2d Cir. 1994), 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 199, 200-01 (1995). 
19. Equal protection analysis is inappropriate in this context, despite the fact that the 
undercount affects groups recognized by equal protection analysis as "suspect" classes. See 
infra section 11.B.2. 
20. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 114-15. 
21. See Samuel Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority 
Representation: The Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representa-
tion, 13 REV. Lmo. 1, 6-7 (1993); see also Donald T. Deyo, Comment, To Adjust or Not to 
Adjust: That is the Legal and Political Question, 13 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 114, 117-18 
1102 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1098 
demonstrated that the undercount consistently produced skewed 
results in favor of whites as compared to all minorities, particularly 
African Am.ericans.22 
TABLE 1. DIFFERENTIAL CENSUS UNDERCOUNTS OF AFRICAN 
AMERICANS AND WmTES: 1940-1980 
Percent Missed 
















B. The Evolution of the 1990 Adjusted Census 
In response to the 1980 census's differential undercount and the 
massive amount of litigation that followed,23 the Census Bureau un-
dertook to study the issue and to determine the feasibility of statis-
tically adjusting the 1990 census. In 1984, the Bureau created the 
Undercount Steering Committee and Undercount Research Staff to 
direct the inquiry,24 and, by May 1987, the Bureau had determined 
that it could and would adjust the 1990 census using a broadbased 
PES.25 Top Department of Commerce officials, however, swiftly re-
versed this decision.26 This reversal resulted in another spate of liti-
gation. The Secretary of Commerce eventually settled these claims 
by agreeing to conduct a PBS and a DSE after the 1990 census and 
to consider de novo - after the new data were collected 
whether to adjust the official enumeration.27 
(1993) (discussing the political disadvantages to minorities resulting from the 1990 census 
undercount). 
22. See lssacharoff & Lichtman, supra note 21, at 8. 
23. Following the 1980 census, a total of 54 suits challenged the census's accuracy and 
demanded that the Census Bureau correct the differential undercount. See ANDERSON, 
supra note 2, at 230. 
24. See City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114, 1117 (2d 
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995). 
25. See 34 F.3d at 1118. 
26. See 34 F.3d at 1118; Judish & Judish, supra note 18, at 202-03. 
27. After the Department of Commerce announced its decision not to adjust the upcom· 
ing census, New York City, joined by several other cities, groups, and individuals, sought to 
force the Department to revise its position and to correct the differential undercount. See 
City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 713 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) 
[hereinafter NYC v. DOC I]. The Department moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
the court did not have jurisdiction over the Secretary's decision not to adjust. The district 
court rejected this motion, ruling that "the State and municipal plaintiffs have established an 
injury in the form of loss of federal funding" and that the court "is vested with power to 
review the Secretary's decision not to adjust the 1990 census" under the "arbitrary and capri· 
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The PBS conducted by the Census Bureau divided the popula-
tion into 1392 categories or "poststrata" covering age, gender, re-
gion, race, geographical area, and owner-renter status in an attempt 
to eliminate "capture bias" - the differing probabilities of being 
counted. Officials then examined in detail 5300 "blocks" and deter-
mined how many households and individuals from each poststratum 
lived in each block.28 The Census Bureau then compared these 
data with figures from the census and thus estimated rates of omis-
sion and erroneous overcounting for each poststratum. From this 
comparison, the Bureau determined an appropriate adjustment for 
each poststratum. These adjustment factors then underwent 
"smoothing" to reduce sampling error, and, finally, the Bureau mul-
tiplied each poststratum within each census block by the appropri-
ate adjustment rate to create a final adjusted population estimate 
- aDSE.29 
A DSE uses the "capture-recapture" method to ascertain the 
quality of an initial measurement. The classic example of capture-
recapture involves estimating the number of fish in a lake. The pro-
cedure operates as follows: (1) capture 1000 fish from a lake, tag 
them, and release them; and (2) capture 100 fish from the same 
lake. If fifty of those fish have tags, then you estimate that your 
initial sweep captured fifty percent of all the fish. The total esti-
mated population - the DSE - therefore, is 2000 fish.30 In the 
cious standard as set forth in § 706 of the [Administrative Procedure Act]." 713 F. Supp. at 
50, 53, 54 (referring to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994)). 
In an effort to avoid disruption of the 1990 census, the parties entered into a stipulation in 
July 1989, whereby the Secretary of Commerce agreed to conduct a full scale PES, create an 
eight-member Special Advisory Panel, and draw up guidelines that would provide the Secre-
tary with criteria by which he would decide anew whether to adjust the 1990 enumeration 
using the completed PES. The Secretary chose four members of the Panel outright and se-
lected the remaining four members from a pool of seven nominees recommended by the 
plaintiffs. See City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 915 
n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter NYC v. DOC III]. The Secretary released the guidelines in 
March 1990, but the plaintiffs challenged them on the grounds that the criteria were imper-
missibly vague and that, to the extent they were clear, they favored nonadjustment. Judge 
Joseph M. McLaughlin noted that the "issue [was] indeed close" but ultimately concluded 
that the Secretary's formulation achieved a "bare minimum" of compliance. City of New 
York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761, 769-70, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
[hereinafter NYC v. DOC II]. 
28. "Blocks" are the ''minimal units of census geography." David A. Freedman, Adjusting 
the Census of 1990, 34 JURIMETRics J. 99, 102 (1993). The Census Bureau generates these 
divisions, which do not correspond to any geographical or political pattern relevant to this 
Note. There were 4,830,514 inhabited blocks in the 1990 census. See Robert A. Mosbacher, 
Decision of the Secretary of Commerce on Whether a Statistical Adjustment of the 1990 Census 
of Population and Housing Should Be Made for Coverage Deficiencies Resulting in an 
Overcount or Undercount of the Population, in 56 Fed. Reg. 33,582, 33,587 (1991). 
29. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,626-34 (discussing the procedure used by the Census 
Bureau in arriving at the DSE); NYC v. DOC IV, 34 F.3d at 1121. For a detailed account of 
"smoothing," see John E. Rolph, The Census Adjustment Trial: Reflections of a Witness for 
the Plaintiffs, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 85 (1993). 
30. See NYC v. DOC III, 822 F. Supp. at 914 n.4. 
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example, the initial census corresponds to step (1), the PBS corre-
sponds to step (2), and the DSE corresponds to the final adjusted 
population estimate.31 
In 1990, the Census Bureau made a rigorous and meticulous ef-
fort to avoid an undercount.32 Despite this effort, the August 1992 
revised version of the 1990 DSE indicates that the initial enumera-
tion undercounted African Americans by 4.43%, Hispanics by 
4.96%, Asian-Pacific Islanders by 2.33%, American Indians by 
4.52%, and non-Hispanic Whites by 1.18%. Renters as a group suf-
fered a 4.32 % undercount.33 The Census Bureau conducted a con-
current Demographic Analysis (DA) in an effort to help evaluate 
the accuracy of the DSE. The DA measures changes in the nation's 
aggregate population by tracking births, deaths, immigration, and 
emigration.34 In 1990, the DA confirmed the DSE's broad out-
lines.35 The DSE's finding of an approximately 1.6% net un-
dercount exceeded the estimated 1980 undercount,36 an 
embarrassing fact that the Secretary of Commerce alluded to when 
31. The success of this method in the census context rests on a number of assumptions. 
These include: perfect matching - the assumption that "individuals in the census can be 
matched with those in the PES, without error"; independence - the assumption that the 
"probability of an individual being included in the PES does not depend on whether the 
individual was included in the census"; and homogeneity - the assumption that the 
"probabilities of inclusion do not vary from individual to individual." Fienberg, supra note 2, 
at 75. For a more detailed description of the 1990 PES and the subsequent DSE, see infra 
section I.C. 
32. This effort included a multilevel mail campaign, targeted at households of various 
races and languages; a follow-up phase involving many additional mailings; at least six at-
tempts at in-person follow up in cases where a known address had not returned its census 
forms; and finally a "Coverage-Improvement Program" which sought to raise public aware-
ness of the enumeration's importance, as well as to focus additional energies on blocks that 
had particularly scant response rates. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,623-26. See also NYC 
v. DOC IV, 34 F.3d at 1120-21; Fienberg, supra note 2, at 69. 
33. See Barbara E. Bryant, Decision of the Director of the Bureau of the Census on 
Whether To Use Information From the 1990 Post-Enumeration Survey (PES) To Adjust the 
Base for the Intercensal Population Estimates Produced by the Bureau of the Census, in SB 
Fed. Reg. 69, 70 (1993). As Director of the Bureau of the Census between 19B9 and 1993, 
Dr. Bryant presided over the 1990 census and PES. 
34. The DA estimates change in the population by the following formula: 
Population, - Population,.1 = Births, - Deaths, + Immigration, - Emigration,. 
Where t denotes year, the right side of the formula, and the left side of the formula "can be 
summed to provide estimates of population in successive years." William R. Bell, Using In-
formation From Demographic Analysis in Post-Enumeration Survey Estimation, BB J. AM. 
STAT. AssN. 1106, 1113 (1993). For an extensive discussion of a DA's usefulness in coverage 
evaluation, see J. Gregory Robinson et al., Estimation of Population Coverage in the 1990 
United States Census Based on Demographic Analysis, BB J. AM. STAT. AssN. 1061 (1993). 
35. For the 1990 census, the DA "showed an estimated net undercount of 1.B%" in com-
parison to the 1.6% undercount indicated by the initial PES. "The closeness of the two un-
dercount measures reinforced them both, although they did not match in every detail .•.• " 
Barbara Everitt Bryant, Census-Taking for a Litigious, Data-Driven Society, 6 CHANCE 44, 46 
(1993). 
36. The 1990 census exhibited a gross error of more than 10%, while, using the same 
measure, the gross error for the 19BO census was 7%. See Fienberg, supra note 2, at 69-70. 
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he referred to the 1990 census as "one of the two best censuses ever 
taken in this country."37 
Ultimately Secretary of Commerce Robert A. Mosbacher de-
cided against statistical adjustment of the 1990 census.38 Some 
commentators have speculated that given the strong Democratic in-
clinations of the undercounted population, political considerations 
influenced the Secretary's decision not to adjust the 1990 census,39 
but, whatever the core motivation,40 the Secretary's choice meant 
that an estimated four million persons41 would suffer vote dilution 
and underrepresentation in the construction of congressional 
districts. 
C. The Superiority of an Adjusted Census 
Given the magnitude of the task and the powerful barriers to 
full coverage,42 there can be no absolutely accurate accounting of 
the nation's population, so any enumeration must bear "some de-
gree of uncertainty."43 Some data sets, however, are more accurate 
than others. There exist two basic measures of census accuracy: 
"numeric accuracy" - how closely a data set approximates the ac-
tual number of people in a particular jurisdiction; and "distributive 
accuracy" - how closely a data set approximates the true distribu-
tion of population shares among the states. Section I.C.1 demon-
strates that the adjusted census surpasses the official census with 
regard to numeric accuracy. Section I.C.2 argues that the bulk of 
the available evidence indicates that the adjusted census also 
achieves a more accurate distribution of the population among the 
states than the unadjusted census. Section I.C.3 shows that, in the 
37. 56 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (1991). But see Fienberg, supra note 2, at 79 (arguing that, in 
tenns of gross error, the 1990 census "may well be the worst since the Census Bureau began 
the careful measurement of undercount in 1940"). 
38. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,582. 
39. See, e.g., Judish & Judish, supra note 18, at 203. But consider Judge McLaughlin's 
comments in City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 
918 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), where he addressed the plaintiffs' arguments that 
contacts made by then-White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and a member of his 
staff to Commerce Department officials other than Mr. Mosbacher tainted the deci-
sion .... While it does appear that Mr. Sununu and his subordinates expressed their 
contempt for adjustment to Department of Commerce personnel, I cannot, on the rec-
ord before me, conclude that such contacts represented improper influence. Moreover, 
the plaintiff's attack on the integrity of Mr. Mosbacher - who was never a party to 
these conversations - does not warrant extended discussion here. 
40. Dr. Bryant attributes the Secretary's decision against adjustment to institutional iner-
tia: "If something has never been adjusted in [200 years] and there is a controversy •.. that 
speaks to not making the change .... [E]verything favored the status quo, unless it was just 
absolutely clear cut." Interview with Dr. Barbara E. Bryant in Ann Arbor, MI (Oct. 27, 1995) 
(tape of interview on file with Michigan Law Review). 
41. See Bryant, supra note 35, at 44. 
42. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
43. 58 Fed. Reg. 69, 71 (1993). 
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presence of these findings, the vast majority of knowledgeable ob-
servers favored adjustment. 
1. Numeric Accuracy 
The DSE produces a better estimate of the nation's actual popu-
lation than the official census in terms of numeric accuracy. The 
DSE undoubtedly generates a better aggregate national figure than 
the unadjusted census because analysis on this level mitigates any 
theoretical error from the small sample size of the PES's 1392 post-
strata.44 Furthermore, there is a broadbased consensus that the 
DSE also produces more accurate numbers on the state level.45 Fi-
nally, even Secretary Mosbacher concedes that fully two-thirds of 
the nation's population "live in jurisdictions where the adjusted 
counts appear more accurate."46 Because no census or adjustment 
is perfectly accurate, the Census Bureau should use the data set that 
best represents the true population.47 The DSE is that data set be-
cause of the consensus that it produces a more accurate count of the 
nation's total population and because it is more likely to be numeri-
cally accurate on the state level. 
Although nearly all scholars agree that the DSE is superior for 
national and state figures, whether the DSE significantly improves 
on the census's substate findings remains in equipoise.48 This diver-
44. See, e.g., 5S Fed. Reg. at 70 ("[I]t is the unanimous opinion of senior statisticians and 
demographers at the Bureau of the Census comprising the Committee on Adjustment of 
Postcensal Estimates (CAPE) that adjustment would improve the accuracy of the 1990 cen-
sus base at the national level."); 56 Fed. Reg. 33,582, 33,5S3 (1991) ("There is general agree-
ment that at the national level, the adjusted counts are better .... "). 
45. See, e.g., Mary H. Mulry & Bruce D. Spencer, Accuracy of the 1990 Census and Un-
dercount Adjustments, SS J. AM. STAT. AssN. lOSO, 10S5 (1993) (finding that, under loss func-
tions approved by the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards, the total error model 
showed that, as compared to the unadjusted census, the DSE was likely more accurate in 
either 33 or 40 states). 
46. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,5S3. 
47. One commentator has written: 
The principal motivation should be to produce the most accurate estimates possible. 
That no estimates are the truth should not prevent use of the best, whatever their source. 
That there is not complete agreement on which estimates are the best should not prevent 
use of estimates that are widely regarded as better than some other estimates currently 
used or under consideration. 
Allen L. Schirm, The Effects of Census Undercount Adjustment on Congressional Apportion-
ment, S6 J. AM. STAT. AssN. 526, 539 (1991). 
4S. Potential substate error in the DSE comes from the correlation bias caused by the 
"homogeneity" assumption - the assumption that "the probabilities of enumeration are the 
same for all members of the population." Juha M. Alho et al., Estimating Heterogeneity in 
the Probabilities of Enumeration for Dual-System Estimation, SS J. AM. STAT. AssN. 1130, 
1130 (1993). This equivocal error should not cause fear that a DSE would inflate unreasona· 
bly the population in compensation for the undercount since "[t]he [correlation] bias is usu· 
ally downward, leading to underestimation of the population." Bell, supra note 34, at 1106. 
Alho finds that statisticians feasibly can correct census data for heterogeneity using "imputa-
tion" and "logistic" techniques. See Alho et al., supra, at 1136; see also Mulry & Spencer, 
supra note 45, at 10S4 (finding that for metropolitan and nonmetropolitian "counties of less 
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sity of opinion prevents an unqualified endorsement of the DSE, 
but it does not logically lead to the adoption of the unadjusted cen-
sus. The Secretary argued that in the presence of this uncertainty, 
discretion compels the use of the unadjusted census.49 This position 
ignores the undisputed fact that the DSE demonstrably surpasses 
the census on the national and state level. Furthermore, even its 
critics admit that two-thirds of the population live in jurisdictions 
where adjustment would improve upon the census. These attrib-
utes, when balanced against the lone fact that scholars cannot de-
termine conclusively whether the DSE bests the census on substate 
levels, do not compel a decision in favor of the unadjusted census, 
particularly considering the impossibility of finding perfect data. 
Instead, they lead to the conclusion that the DSE's numeric accu-
racy surpasses the numeric accuracy of the unadjusted census on 
the national, state, and possibly local level, and that at no level of 
analysis is the DSE demonstrably worse than the unadjusted census 
data. The DSE is, therefore, a better estimate of the nation's true 
population than the unadjusted census :figures.50 
than 200,000 population, counties of 200,000 or greater population, places with less than 
25,000 population, places with 25,000-49,999 population, and places with 50,000 or greater 
population ... the risk ... was smaller for the DSE than for the census" and that "these 
results strongly indicate that the DSE is more accurate than the census"). Fienberg, specifi-
cally addressing the substate accuracy of the DSE, concluded that "the Bureau's calculations 
show the superiority of the adjusted counts at the level of the states and below." Fienberg, 
supra note 2, at 79. But see Kenneth W. Wachter, The Census Adjustment Trial: An Ex-
change, 34 JuRIMElRICS J. 107, 114 (1993) ("[T]he adjusted state and local share are very 
likely worse than the original census figures."). · 
49. Secretary Mosbacher stated: 
What all these tests show ... is that the adjusted figures for some localities will be an 
improvement and for others the census counts will be better .... [W]e don't really know 
how much better or how much worse. If the scientists cannot agree on these issues, how 
can we expect the losing cities and states as well as the American public to accept this 
change? 
56 Fed. Reg. at 33,583; see also Freedman, supra note 28. 
50. Even if apprehensions about substate error within the DSE outweighed its demon-
strated advantages, other statistical methods exist that produce figures that exceed the accu-
racy of the unadjusted census. One scholar has demonstrated that a combination of the DSE 
and DA can produce population estimates that reduce the amount of correlation bias in the 
ordinary DSE, by essentially using strong DA population estimates as a check for the DSE. 
See Bell, supra note 34, at 1107. · 
Others have used an Administrative List Supplement (ALS) in combination with census 
figures and the PES to produce "triple-system models that allow for heterogeneous catch-
ability among individuals" in a manner that corrects some of the theorized errors in the DSE. 
"Heterogeneous catchability" refers to the differing probabilities that each individual will be 
"captured" (counted) by the census or the PES and is, therefore, another term for correlation 
bias. See John N. Darroch et al., A Three-Sample Multiple-Recapture Approach to Census 
Population Estimation With Heterogeneous Catchability, 88 J. AM. STAT. AssN. 1137, 1145 
(1993). The ALS consists of "pre-census administrative records of state and federal govern-
ment agencies, including Employment Security, driver's license, Internal Revenue Service, 
Selective Service, and Veteran's Administration records." Id. at 1138. Another method fuses 
census data with data from the PES to create estimates that "have less bias than the unad-
justed counts, but less variance than the DSE." Alan M. Zaslavsky, Combining Census, Dual-
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2. Distributive Accuracy 
Despite the evidence that the adjusted census improved upon 
the census's numeric accuracy, Secretary Mosbacher favored the in-
itial, unadjusted enumeration.s1 He refused to permit adjustment 
because he decided that the "primary criterion for accuracy should 
be distributive accuracy - that is, getting most nearly correct the 
proportions of people in different areas."S2 In the end, therefore, 
he decided not to correct the census because, in his estimation, it 
remained unclear whether alteration definitively and comprehen-
sively would improve the distribution of population shares among 
all the states.s3 
The Secretary's decision to disregard numeric accuracy in defer-
ence to distributive accuracy falters both factually and conceptually. 
According to Mosbacher, "28 or 29 states were estimated to be 
made less accurate if the adjustment were to be used. "S4 But in 
order to reach this conclusion, the Secretary had to more than 
double the variance of the smoothed adjustment factors. By artifi-
cially increasing the variance and then using that new figure in his 
calculations, the Secretary warped the DSE's adjustment factors 
and made them appear significantly less effective than their actual 
variance indicates.ss By doubling the adjustment factors' variance 
in his calculations, the Secretary made a very conservative estimate 
System, and Evaluation Study Data to Estimate PopulatJon Shares, 88 J. AM. STAT. AssN. 
1092, 1092 (1993). 
In the end, "[t]he most striking feature of the[se] estimates is the close agreement be· 
tween the different estimators for each EPS [Evaluation Poststrata]. In every EPS, every 
estimate is closer to the DSE than to the census," and each "[is] at least as accurate as the 
better of the two original alternatives." Id. at 1101, 1103. Evaluation Poststrata are 13 aggre· 
gates of the 1392 poststrata used by a number of commentators to evaluate the integrity of 
the PES. These groupings give analysts sufficiently large data subsets to support a wide 
range of inquiries. See generally Mulry & Spencer, supra note 45, at 1081. Although none of 
the above methods has received the broad scrutiny imposed upon the DSE, each promises to 
make substantial improvements upon unadjusted census figures, demonstrating that, even if 
the DSE does not satisfy all its critics, there exist real and better alternatives to the unad· 
justed census. 
51. For articles supporting the Secretary's decision, see Freedman, supra note 28, at 105 
(arguing that, although the census contains regrettable error, "there is no strong evidence on 
the table to show that adjustment will improve the distributional accuracy for states or other 
areas"); Wachter, supra note 48, at 114 (maintaining that the DSE "introduces new errors 
into the population shares of states, cities, counties, and other jurisdictions"). For broad· 
gauged criticism of the Secretary's statistical findings, see Fienberg, supra note 2, at 82 (find· 
ing that the evidence supported the "superiority of the adjusted counts when compared to 
those from the basic and flawed enumeration. The Secretary ignored, misrepresented, or 
rejected the evidence adduced by the Census Bureau. The arguments marshaled in support 
of his decision were badly flawed and •.. did not follow from the administrative record."). 
52. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,584. 
53. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,583. 
54. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33,583. 
55. See Mulry & Spencer, supra note 45, at 1085. The variance (the sum of the squared 
deviations from the mean divided by n) measures the dispersion of results in a sample. 
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of the DSE's accuracy and essentially assumed that which he sought 
to prove. Without this manipulated variance and in using loss func-
tions approved by the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Stan-
dards,56 the total error model showed that, as compared to the 
unadjusted census, the DSE was more accurate for at least thirty-
three states.57 Additionally, the DA conducted by the Census Bu-
reau indicated that the vast majority of the DSE's state figures com-
ports with demographic expectations in both direction and 
degree.5s This demographic support, when combined with official 
error models, indicate that, with respect to distributive accuracy, 
the DSE produces a better result than the official census. 
Even if the Secretary's opinion concerning the relative distribu-
tive accuracy of the two censuses is correct, the adjusted census still 
would be the better data set on account of its superior numeric ac-
curacy. Numeric accuracy must be the primary consideration when 
evaluating census data because the Court has declared that the ap-
portionment of congressional seats " 'among the several States ... 
according to their respective Numbers,' ... requires, by virtue of § 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 'counting the whole number of per-
sons in each State.' The number of persons in each State is to be 
calculated by 'actual Enumeration,' conducted every ten years.''59 
The S~cretary's focus on the distribution of the population among 
the states, therefore, cannot withstand scrutiny because its open dis-
regard for numeric accuracy undermines the Constitution's require-
56. Dr. Bryant stated: 
Loss function analysis depends upon first, building an estimate of the true population 
then comparing the census and the PES/dual-system estimate to this estimate. Although 
the test indicates whether the PES or the census produces the more accurate distribution 
of population between states, it does not show which state estimates are improved or 
whether any are made less accurate. 
58 Fed. Reg. 69, 71 (1991). 
57. See Mulry & Spencer, supra note 45, at 1085. Using another federally approved loss 
function, the total-error model indicated that the DSE was more accurate than the unad-
justed census in 40 states. Since loss-function analysis only indicates whether the DSE is 
more accurate than the census, it is incorrect to conclude that the DSE makes 10or17 states 
less accurate. In these 10 or 17 states, the DSE very well may equal the unadjusted census. 
See supra note 56; see also 58 Fed. Reg. at 70 ("There is substantial consensus, but not una-
nimity of opinion, among [many expert advisors] that adjustment would improve the distribu-
tion of population shares among the states."). 
58. Dr. Bryant also reported: 
As a check on the loss function analysis result, Census Bureau demographers and a 
demographer expert from outside the Census Bureau reviewed each state's estimated 
undercount to see if it made demographic sense, given what they know about the demo-
graphic composition of each state. For 44 states and the District of Columbia, the PES/ 
LDSE] estimates of undercount appear logical. That is, given the proportions and con-
centrations of different demographic groups in each state, the mix of rental and owner-
occupied housing, and measured undercount patterns for these, the undercount in rela-
tion to other states was what demographers might expect. 
58 Fed. Reg. at 71. 
59. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 791 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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ment that the decennial enumeration "count[] the whole number of 
persons in each state. "60 
3. Expert Observers 
In addition to the persuasive power of the figures themselves, a 
consensus of informed commentators also indicates that the DSE 
better approximates the true population than the unadjusted cen-
sus.61 Among the Secretary's advisors from the Census Bureau, 
recommendations unambiguously favored adjustment. The 
Undercount Steering Committee voted seven to two in favor of ad-
justment and argued that "an adjustment based on the PES would 
ameliorate the undercount of minority groups and improve the ac-
curacy of counts for the Nation, States, and places of 100,000 popu-
lation or more."62 Dr. Barbara E. Bryant, the Director of the 
Census between 1989 and 1993, counseled in favor of statistical cor-
rection, after concluding that the DSE would improve the accuracy 
"of the count - both numerically and proportionally."63 
Another significant independent assessment of the DSE came in 
City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce, 64 a 
thirteen-day bench trial before Second Circuit Judge Joseph M. 
McLaughlin, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of New 
York.65 Although Judge McLaughlin eventually ruled in favor of 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
61. The Special Advisory Panel, composed of four experts nominated by the plaintiffs in 
NYC v. DOC I and four experts selected by the Secretary, predictably split four to four on 
the issue, with the four Commerce Department appointees voting against adjustment and the 
four members recommended by the plaintiffs voting for correction. See 56 Fed. Reg. 33,582, 
33,610-23 (1991). The Secretary's position also found support from two political appointees 
- the Under-Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs and the Administrator of the 
Economics and Statistics Administration. See City of New York v. United States Dept. of 
Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995). 
62. UNDERCOUNT STEERING COMMI1TEE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TECHNICAL ASSESS· 
MENT OF THE ACCURACY OF THE UNADJUSTED VERSUS ADJUSTED 1990 CENSUS COUNTS 2 
(1991). The Committee further advised that "the improvement in counts on the average for 
the Nation, States, and places over 100,000 population outweighs the risk that the accuracy of 
adjusted counts might be less for some smaller areas." Id. (emphasis added). The Census 
Bureau created the Undercount Steering Committee in 1984 to explore potential remedies 
for the differential undercount. See generally supra text accompanying notes 23-27. 
63. BARBARA EVERl'IT BRYANT, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RECOMMENDATION TO SEC· 
RETARY OF COMMERCE ROBERT A. MOSBACHER ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ADJUST THE 
1990 CENsus 11 (1991). In early 1993, Dr. Bryant chose not to use the 1990 PES to adjust the 
base for the intercensal population estimates produced by the Bureau of the Census. Dr. 
Bryant "reluctantly made the decision that in the litigious atmosphere in which U.S. census 
and population estimates must be defended the census base for intercensal population esti-
mates could not adjusted." Bryant, supra note 35, at 48. This fear of litigation stemming 
from a change in position, therefore, "overrode her 'best statistical judgment.'" Id. 
64. City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
65. After the Secretary's decision not to adjust the census, New York City sought to over-
turn that decision by asserting that it was both "arbitrary and capricious" and therefore void 
under the Administrative Procedure Act's standard of review. See 822 F. Supp. at 910. 
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the Department because of the extremely permissive "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),66 he declared that the plaintiffs had proven that "adjust-
ment is statistically feasible, and would improve the quality of the 
counts for most purposes while ameliorating the profoundly dis-
turbing problem of [the] differential undercount."67 Perhaps most 
tellingly, the Judge declared that "[p]laintiffs have made a powerful 
case that discretion would have been more wisely employed in 
favor of adjustment. Indeed, were this Court called upon to decide 
this issue de novo, I probably would have ordered the 
adjustment. "68 
II. STANDING To SUE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
The Secretary's final decision not to adjust the census sparked a 
new round of litigation.69 These actions all sought to force the 
Secretary of Commerce to reverse his decision and to adjust the 
official census. Section II.A demonstrates that such efforts gener-
ally have failed because the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the 
Commerce Department on this issue. The injury that lies at the 
heart of their complaints - underrepresentation - does not spring 
directly from the Secretary's decision not to adjust the census but 
from the independent action of their state legislatures. Section II.B 
criticizes the Second Circuit's ruling in City of New York v. United 
States Department of Commerce because it inappropriately found 
standing and ignored the important distinction in redistricting juris-
prudence between analysis under Article I, Section 2 and analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
A. Standing under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
The Court's recent articulation of the standing doctrine in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife70 declares that: 
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 
elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
66. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (1994). Judge McLaughlin made clear that his rigid conception 
of his judicial role and the severe nature of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard animated 
his conclusion to uphold the Secretary's decision not to adjust. See NYC v. DOC III, 822 F. 
Supp. at 929. See generally infra text accompanying notes 93-95. 
67. NYC v. DOC III, 822 F. Supp. at 931. 
68. 822 F. Supp. at 928. 
69. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114, 1123-
24 (2d Cir. 1994), cert granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995); City of Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F.3d 1367, 
1377 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1217 (1994); Tucker v. United States Dept. of 
Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1411, 1413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); NYC v. 
DOC III, 822 F. Supp. at 916. 
70. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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particularized and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypo-
thetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the in-
jury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be ''fairly ... 
trace[ able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," 
that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."71 
The absence of any of these elements strips a plaintiff of standing 
and prohibits Article m courts from taking any positive remedial 
action.72 
Plaintiffs who sue the Department of Commerce over its failure 
to adjust census data do not have standing because they fail to sat-
isfy Lujan's second prong - the causation requirement. Plaintiffs 
in undercount litigation suffer injury because they live and vote in 
congressional districts with disproportionately large populations, 
which dilutes the voting power of individuals therein.73 The state in 
which the district is located, however, bears the responsibility for 
this harm because each state constructs its own congressional elec-
tion districts.74 If the Federal Constitution required states to use 
census data, then the Department would be a direct cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries, and states' incomplete control over congres-
sional redistricting would not affect litigation against the Depart-
71. 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
72. See 504 U.S. at 561 (stating that these three requirements are "an indispensable part 
of the plaintiff's case, [and] each element must be supported in the same way as any other 
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof'). 
73. Plaintiffs also have brought suit against the Secretary of Commerce alleging that his 
decision not to adjust the census has cost them population-linked federal funds. Although an 
adherence to Lujan also should create second-prong difficulties for these actions - given 
that Congress is not required to use official census figures in its distribution of funds - a few 
courts have found that municipalities and individuals have standing to challenge the Secre-
tary's failure to correct for the differential undercount, based on a deprivation of federal 
funds. See City of Detroit, 4 F.3d at 1374 (holding that plaintiffs do not have standing to 
challenge the census undercount on a vote-dilution claim but that they do have standing to 
challenge the undercount on the basis of lost federal funds); Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 
838 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling that plaintiffs had sufficient factual foundation for a challenge to 
the undercount on the basis of lost federal funds), revd. on other grounds, 653 F.2d 732 (2d 
Cir. 1981). But see State of Texas v. Mosbacher, 783 F. Supp. 308, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1992) 
(arguing that the state does not have standing to challenge the undercount in the absence of a 
direct loss of funds). The fact that courts have found standing based on a loss of federal 
funds does not suggest that plaintiffs successfully can challenge the decision not to adjust the 
census and actually obtain relief for either a vote-dilution injury or a lost-federal-funds in-
jury. In fact, none of these actions has had any success because the statutes that govern the 
census do not create a justiciable right to accuracy. See, e.g., City of Detroit, 4 F.3d at 1376 
(stating that "these enactments do not create justiciable rights"). These cases, therefore, suf-
fer from the same problem that has plagued other efforts to force the Department of Com-
merce to adjust the census: plaintiffs fail to recognize that the administrator of the census 
only has a positive duty to assure a good-faith effort to achieve accuracy, and so his decisions 
are only reviewable under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard detailed in the APA. See 
generally infra text accompanying notes 93-95. 
74. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1206 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 5.2 (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-103 (1994). 
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ment of Commerce. State legislatures, however, are not required to 
use official census data when redistricting.75 Absent such a consti-
tutional mandate, a state's decision to use unadjusted census data 
- a decision wholly beyond the control of the Department of 
Commerce - constitutes the kind of "independent action of some 
third party not before the court," that falls outside the standing rule 
articulated by the Lujan Court.16 
A good example of this reasoning is found in City of Detroit v. 
Franklin, in which the Sixth Circuit recognized the separation be-
tween the census and congressional redistricting and consequently 
denied the plaintiffs standing to challenge the census on a com-
plaint of unequal representation. The City of Detroit sued Secre-
tary of Commerce Barbara Franklin in an attempt to force her to 
adjust the 1990 census.77 Detroit complained that it had suffered 
injury from both underrepresentation with regard to other Michi-
gan cities78 and an insufficient share of federal funds distributed on 
the basis of population. 79 Affirming the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit held that Detroit lacked 
standing on the representation prong of its complaint because 
Michigan's "decision (whether to use the [census] data or not) is an 
independent act breaking the chain of causation between the chal-
lenged actions of the Census Bureau ... and the injury to the plain-
tiffs. "80 The decision in City of Detroit acknowledged that the state 
legislature and not the Secretary of Commerce has ultimate respon-
75. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91, 92-97 (1966) (upholding an apportionment 
based on a registered-voter basis); see also City of Detroit, 4 F.3d at 1373 (noting that states 
are "not constitutionally compelled to use the Bureau's census data when redistricting"); 
Assembly of State v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 918 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) 
("The states are not obligated to use official census data when drawing their state legislative 
districts or their congressional districts." (citations omitted)); Garza v. County of Los Ange-
les, 918 F.2d 763, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1990) (using updated, noncensus data to examine the influ-
ence of redistricting on Hispanics), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991); Young v. Klutznick, 652 
F.2d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 1981) (declaring that "[t]here is no reason to believe that states would 
not be free to adjust census figures for redistricting"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Bor-
ough of Bethel Brook v. Stans, 449 F2d 575, 582 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that states need 
not use the federal census for apportioning their legislatures). See generally infra section 
III.B. 
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted). 
77. See City of Detroit, 4 F.3d at 1369. 
78. The plaintiffs argued that, in a redistricting based on the unadjusted 1990 census, 
Detroit encompassed 1.769 congressional districts, while a district mapping based on the 
DSE would have given Detroit 1.811 congressional districts. "Thus, the use of the unadjusted 
official population count to determine Congressional representation within . . . Michigan 
means that the residents of .•. Detroit have proportionately less representation in the House 
of Representatives than the residents of all or virtually all of the other cities and sub-units in 
Michigan." 4 F.3d at 1372 n.4. 
79. The remedy for the deprivation of federal funds rests neither on the right to vote nor 
on the right to an equal apportionment. That deprivation and the legal issues that spring 
from it are, therefore, beyond the scope of this Note. 
80. City of Detroit, 4 F.3d at 1373. 
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sibility for the composition of congressional election districts. Thus, 
plaintiffs seeking to combat equal representation related to the dif-
ferential undercount must bring actions against the state legisla-
tures directly responsible for the injury and not the administrators 
of the census. 
B. The Second Circuit and City of New York v. United States 
Department of Commerce 
In City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce, 
the Second Circuit took two unprecedented steps with regard to 
standing and redistricting jurisprudence. In its decision, the Second 
Circuit vacated Judge McLaughlin's judgment in the lower court 
decision81 and remanded the case for further proceedings. The 
court disagreed with Judge McLaughlin's use of the APA's "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard and ordered that he instead use a 
"more traditional standard applicable to an equal protection claim 
that a fundamental right has been denied on the basis of race or 
ethnicity."82 Section II.B.1 criticizes the Second Circuit's failure to 
consider standing in light of Lujan. Section II.B.2 demonstrates 
that, even leaving aside the question of standing, the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion inappropriately grounds its analysis in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and thus contravenes the established distinction 
within redistricting jurisprudence between congressional districts, 
subject to Article I, Section 2, and state and local districts, subject 
to the Equal Protection Clause. 
1. The Second Circuit's Erroneous Finding of Standing 
The Second Circuit's finding of standing rested on a single, im-
precise assumption - the court wrote that "[i]naccuracies in the 
decennial census affect both the distribution of Representatives 
among states and the distribution of Representatives within most 
states, since states use the census figures in drawing district lines."83 
Based on this finding, the court imposed standards of exactitude 
which ordinarily apply to state governments in their redistricting 
efforts on the Secretary in his decision not to adjust the census.84 
This leap of logic imposes too much responsibility for the un-
dercount on the Secretary. As noted in section II.A, the states have 
no obligation to use official census data in their redistricting efforts. 
The various state legislatures decide to use such data, and they are 
81. See City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). See generally supra text accompanying notes 64-68. 
82. City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114, 1131 (2d Cir. 
1994), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995). 
83. 34 F.3d at 1128. 
84. See 34 F.3d at 1125-29. 
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responsible for the consequences of that decision. Consequently, 
the Secretary's decision is not directly linked to vote dilution, and 
this disrupted causation properly triggers Lujan standing analysis.ss 
Tue Second Circuit, therefore, erred when it assumed that the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue the Secretary because they did not 
satisfy Lujan's second prong on account of the intervening in-
dependent action of their state legislatures. 
2. The Limits of Equal Protection Analysis 
Even if the Supreme Court ignored Lujan and found that the 
plaintiffs had standing, the Second Circuit's use of equal protection 
analysis and application of strict scrutiny could not withstand close 
examination because the court confused two distinct doctrinal sys-
tems within redistricting jurisprudence. Tue court's opinion main-
tains that a "fundamental right to vote" has been violated and that 
equal protection analysis is therefore appropriate. In applying that 
analysis, the court asserted that because the vote dilution adversely 
affects suspect classes, the Secretary's decision not to adjust must 
"be supported by an official showing that that [decision] (a) fur-
thers a governmental objective that is legitimate, and (b) is essential 
for the achievement of that objective."86 
This reasoning ignores the Supreme Court's clear distinction be-
tween vote-dilution claims relating to congressional districts and 
those relating to state legislative districts. Population-equality stan-
dards for congressional districts spring solely from Article I, Section 
2, while equality standards for state legislative districts grow only 
from the Equal Protection Clause.87 This distinction has substan-
tive consequences, for Article l's equality requirement is signifi-
cantly more exacting than that of the Equal Protection Clause. 88 
Tue Second Circuit's opinion does not recognize this fundamental 
bifurcation and applies equal protection analysis to a vote-dilution 
claim regarding congressional districts. Consequently, the deci-
sion's logical structure rests on a misconceived foundation. 
Even if the Second Circuit applied equal protection analysis to 
congressional districts, a claim of undercount-related vote dilution 
would not violate a fundamental right because equal protection 
analysis permits a ten-percent de minimis population deviation for 
85. See supra section II.A. 
86. NYC v. DOC IV, 34 F.3d at 1131. 
'07. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741-42 {1973) ("[T]here are fundamental 
differences between congressional districting under Art. I and the Wesberry line of cases on 
the one hand, and, on the other, state legislative reapportionments governed by the Fo~r­
teenth Amendment and Reynolds v. Sims . .. and its progeny."); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 
315, 322 {1973) {"The dichotomy between the two lines of cases has consistently been 
maintained."). 
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92, 102-08. 
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election districts.89 With a total undercount of 1.58%,90 the average 
election district drawn from unadjusted census figures should devi-
ate only 1.58% from an identically constructed district drawn from 
adjusted figures. At the extreme, a district composed entirely of 
the most severely undercounted demographic group - Hispanic 
males - would deviate approximately 5.51 % from its population 
ideal.91 These deviations fall well below the constitutionally accept-
able ten-percent de minimis standard, so the use of unadjusted 
figures in the construction of state and local election districts would 
not violate a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause 
and therefore would not trigger strict scrutiny.92 
Because the Secretary's decision not to adjust the census does 
not implicate a fundamental right or equal protection analysis, 
courts instead must apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 
review established by the APA.93 Under this rigid standard, plain-
tiffs cannot assail the Secretary's decision because it does not 
"abuse[] reason."94 Although the vast majority of the evidence 
and advice counseled in favor of adjustment, the Secretary still had 
experts in his camp favoring unadjusted figures.95 Given the exist-
ence of such experts, no court that respects its judicial role should 
overturn his decision as wholly violative of reason, and conse-
quently undercount-related suits against the Secretary of Com-
merce should fail. 
In sum, the Secretary's decision does not directly implicate a 
fundamental right or equal protection analysis, and, because the 
89. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973) ("Insofar as the District Court's judg-
ment rested on the conclusion that the population differential of 9.9% from the ideal district 
•.. made out a prima facie equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
absent special justification, the court was in error."). Compare this 10% de minimis standard 
with the "as nearly as practicable" standard of exact equality required by the Supreme Court 
under Article I, Section 2. See infra text accompanying notes 102-08. 
90. See 58 Fed. Reg. 69, 70 (1993). 
91. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 71. 
92. In the absence of a violation of a fundamental right under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the only form of equal protection analysis available based on the differential un-
dercount is ordinary "disparate impact" analysis. In order to prevail against a government 
defendant on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government's 
action "refiect[ed] a racially discriminatory purpose." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 
(1976); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
Because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that racial animus motivated the Secretary's deci-
sion, they could not prevail in a disparate impact claim. 
93. The Department of Commerce is an administrative agency and thus is subject to the 
APA. See, e.g., Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1980); Cuomo v. Baldrige, 
674 F. Supp. 1089, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 319 F. Supp. 971, 
976-77 (W.D. Pa. 1970), affd., 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971). 
94. City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 929 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). For a detailed discussion about the strictness of the APA's standard, see 
822 F. Supp. at 929. 
95. See supra section I.C. 
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APA permits the Secretary to make unwise decisions regarding ad-
justment, plaintiffs cannot prevail in actions against the Department 
of Commerce. Given the foregoing errors, the Supreme Court 
should reverse City of New York v. Department of Commerce and 
authoritatively close the door on litigation against the Secretary 
over census adjustment. This eventuality would be, however, only a 
temporary setback for plaintiffs seeking to end undercount-related 
vote dilution because they have another, better alternative - suits 
against their state legislatures based on their legislature's use of un-
adjusted census data. 
ill. A REMEDY FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE DIFFERENTIAL 
UNDERCOUNT 
This Part argues that plaintiffs who seek a remedy for represen-
tational inequality linked to the census undercount should sue their 
state governments because the Constitution requires those govern-
ments to create congressional districts of equal population, as mea-
sured by the best population data available. Section ID.A examines 
the current state of apportionment jurisprudence and demonstrates 
that states have an affirmative duty to forge districts that are as 
nearly equal as practicable. Section ID.B shows that, in creating 
those districts, states have a duty to use the best population data 
available and concludes that requiring states to redistrict with ad-
justed census data would result in substantially more equal repre-
sentation for most of the population. Section m.c responds to 
potential criticisms of forcing states to use adjusted census figures in 
congressional redistricting. 
A. The Population-Equality Requirement in Congressional 
Redistricting 
In the 1960s, the Warren Court addressed the substantial popu-
lation differences that existed among federal election districts. 
These gaping discrepancies resulted in widespread vote dilution 
such that the relative ballot power of many minority and urban citi-
zens suffered in comparison to white, rural voters.96 The judiciary's 
reapportionment revolution swept aside decades of practice and in-
validated numerous state constitutional mechanisms for congres-
sional redistricting. 97 
96. See generally GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRE-
SENTATION, POIJTICAL POWER, AND 1liE SUPREME CoURT (1966); ALFRED DE GRAZIA, 
APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1963); ROBERT G. DIXON, DEMO-
CRATIC REPRESENTATION (1969). 
':ll. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (l':J73) (holding that a Texas congressional-
redistricting scheme with an average deviation from the ideal district of .745% and a maxi-
mum deviation of 2.43% was invalid since it did not achieve numeric equality); Wells v. 
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The first salvos of this revolution, Baker v. Carr98 and Wesberry 
v. Sanders,99 established the bedrock doctrines relating to congres-
sional apportionments and required states to shape their congres-
sional districts such that each district has an equal population, as 
nearly as practicable. Baker held that, with regard to state legisla-
tive districts, a claim of vote dilution by malapportionment presents 
a justiciable issue100 and declared that individuals who have suf-
fered vote dilution have standing to challenge their state's appor-
tionment scheme.101 Wesberry extended Baker's finding of 
justiciability and declared that "the command of Art. I, § 2, that 
Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' 
means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congres-
sional election is to be worth as much as another's."102 
Subsequent decisions demonstrated the Court's deepening com-
mitment to strict equality and solidified the requirement that states 
adhere to that standard when constructing their congressional dis-
tricts. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Court defined the "as nearly as 
practicable" standard for purposes of congressional elections, when 
it declared that a Missouri apportionment in which "the most popu-
lous district was 3.13 % above the mathematical ideal, and the least 
populous was 2.84% below,"103 violated the Constitution, since 
"the 'as nearly as practicable' standard requires that the State strive 
to achieve precise mathematical equality. Unless population vari-
ances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted de-
spite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter 
how small. "104 The standard for these justifications lays a heavy 
burden on the state, for the Court considers the "size of the devia-
tions, the importance of the State's interests, the consistency with 
which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availabil-
ity of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests 
yet approximate population equality more closely."105 Missouri of-
fered no legitimate justification for its nearly six-percent deviation, 
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (invalidating a New York redistricting scheme for congres-
sional districts with a total deviation of 13.1 %); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
98. 369 U.S. 186 {1962). 
99. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
100. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-204. 
101. See 369 U.S. at 204-08. Furthermore, Baker established that a legislature's appor-
tionment decisions do not fall under the protective umbrella of the "political question" doc-
trine. See 369 U.S. at 208-37. 
102. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 {footnote omitted). The Wesberry Court grounded its de-
cision on Article I, Section 2 and not the Equal Protection Clause. It did not reach the 
argument that the Georgia apportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause. See 376 
U.S. at 8 n.10. 
103. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528-29 {1969). 
104. 394 U.S. at 530-31 (citation omitted). 
105. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 (1983). 
February 1996] Note - Census Undercount 1119 
and therefore its redistricting scheme could not withstand judicial 
scrutiny. 
More recently, the Court affirmed this emphasis on numeric ex-
actitude in Karcher v. Daggett, when it voided a New Jersey redis-
tricting scheme in which the difference between the smallest and 
largest districts amounted to "0.6984% of the average district."106 
The Court found that this deviation, "although small, [was] not the 
result of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality."107 
New Jersey offered a differential of one percent as a potential de 
minimis threshold, but the Court rejected this notion, arguing that 
"[a]s between two standards - equality or something less than 
equality- only the former reflects the aspirations of Art. I,§ 2."108 
In order to comport with constitutional dictates, therefore, states 
proactively must achieve near numeric perfection in their construc-
tion of congressional districts or else rigorously defend their deci-
sion to countenance inequality. 
B. The Data Requirements for Congressional Redistricting 
In order to achieve this constitutionally mandated population 
equality, state legislatures must construct their congressional dis-
tricts from the "best population data available" - no matter what 
the source.109 The Court first delineated its willingness to accept 
noncensus data in Kirkpatrick, when it grounded its evaluation of 
Missouri's redistricting scheme on "the best population data avail-
able to the legislature in 1967, the 1960 United States census 
figures."110 In the 1960s, in the absence of any additional evidence 
to the contrary, the Court concluded that 1960 census data best rep-
resented the actual population and therefore required their use. 
The Karcher Court reiterated the importance of this requirement 
when it averred that "[a]dopting any standard other than popula-
tion equality, using the best census data available, would subtly 
erode the Constitution's ideal of equal representation."111 In short, 
the Court used official census data to evaluate the comparative 
populations of congressional districts, not because they were used 
by the state, but because they were the best data available. 
Although both the Karcher and Kirkpatrick Courts supported 
the use of census figures under· the circumstances, each majority 
opinion recognized that better data potentially could present them-
selves and expressed an openness to the use of such data. Justice 
106. 462 U.S. at 728. 
107. 462 U.S. at 727. 
108. 462 U.S. at 732. 
109. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969). 
110. 394 U.S. at 528. 
111. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731 (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 532). 
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Brennan, responding to Missouri's argument that its population dis-
crepancies between districts sought to adjust for "projected popula-
tion shifts," detailed the Kirkpatrick Court's willingness to 
countenance the use of alternate figures. Justice Brennan stated 
that where "shifts can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, 
States that are redistricting may properly consider them. . . . Find-
ings as to population trends[, however,] must be thoroughly docu-
mented and applied throughout the State in a systematic, not an ad 
hoc, manner."112 The Karcher Court, too, contemplated the use of 
other figures in redistricting decisions, when it stated that decisions 
based on noncensus data "must be supported with a precision not 
achieved here."113 These matter-of-fact assertions indicate that the 
Court would not hesitate to support the use of alternative data, so 
long as that data achieved a high level of accuracy. 
States, therefore, must use the best data available, and they 
have the flexibility to go beyond official census figures in their con-
stitutionally required search for the best data. The Court has not 
yet required states actively to seek out the best data,114 but, if 
presented with a choice between two already extant data sets -
census data and demonstrably better adjusted data - Karcher and 
Kirkpatrick clearly require the states to use the better data when 
forming congressional districts, unless the legislature can justify the 
decision not to use the superior figures.115 
Although aggrieved plaintiffs cannot sue successfully the De-
partment of Commerce to force census adjustment because they 
lack standing to bring such suits,116 plaintiffs in states where the 
accuracy of the adjusted census demonstrably surpasses the unad-
justed census117 can find a remedy for the differential undercount 
by bringing actions directly against their state governments. In 
these jurisdictions, congressional districts, if drawn on the basis of 
official census figures, unavoidably contain population discrepan-
cies when measured by the standard of the "best population data 
available" - the adjusted census. For example, the 1990 DSE 
shows that if a state constructs a primarily African-American con-
gressional district, then that district is likely to be significantly 
larger than a primarily white district, thus diluting the voting power 
112. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 535. 
113. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 738 (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 535). 
114. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39. 
115. See Senate of California v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1992) ("If the 
State knows that the census data is underrepresentative, it can, and should, utilize noncensus 
data in addition to the official count in its redistricting process." (citation omitted)). 
116. See supra Part II. 
117. The total-error model indicates that the DSE is more accurate than the unadjusted 
census for at least 33 states. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
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of African Americans.118 Because legislators can foresee these dis-
crepancies, redistricting based on official census data violates "the 
'as nearly as practicable' standard," which requires a "good-faith 
effort to achieve precise mathematical equality."119 In the absence 
of such a good-faith effort, the state independently must "justify 
each variance."120 Given the availability of superiorly adjusted 
figures and the minimal cost incurred by states in their use,121 states 
that choose to use the unadjusted census will not be able to satisfy 
this justification requirement. Courts must require these states to 
use adjusted figures for congressional redistricting in order to en-
sure compliance with the strict dictates of Article I, Section 2, as 
interpreted by the Wesberry-Kirkpatrick-Karcher line of cases. By 
following this path, the judiciary will fulfill the promise of the 
American constitutional system by ensuring equal representation 
and freedom from vote dilution.122 
C. Potential Criticisms 
If undercounted groups adopt this Note's recommendations, 
plaintiffs will call upon states to defend vigorously their decisions to 
use unadjusted census figures in congressional redistricting. This 
litigation strategy undoubtedly will receive some criticism. Section 
118. See generally supra section I.B. 
119. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969). 
120. 394 U.S. at 530-31; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 (1983) (requiring 
justification). 
121. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39. 
122. This Note's logic also may assist plaintiffs who sue to correct the interstate appor-
tionment of congressional representatives. Under 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994), the Secretary of 
Commerce must deliver his final census figures to the President, who applies a mathematical 
formula to determine congressional apportionment and gives the result to Congress. The 
Court has ruled that the President has advisory power with regard to these figures and that 
he can order the Secretary of Commerce to revise his findings and conclusions. See Franklin 
v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 799 (1992). Although apportionment among the states can-
not achieve the ideal of one person, one vote because of the indivisibility of seats and the 
Article I, Section 2 requirement that each state be allotted at least one representative, the 
Supreme Court has speculated: 
As we interpreted the constitutional command that Representatives be chosen "by the 
People of the several States" to require the States to pursue equality in representation, 
we might well find that the requirement that Representatives be apportioned among the 
several States "according to their respective Numbers" would also embody the same 
principle of equality. 
United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 461 (1992). Given this dictum, 
perhaps the Court would look favorably upon a challenge that demonstrated that the unad-
justed census figures used in the apportionment of the House of Representatives and ratified 
by the President did not represent best the actual population and the actual distribution of 
people among the states. Such a challenge would try to force the President to reject the 
unadjusted figures offered by the Secretary and to demand the most accurate numbers 
possible. 
If the 1990 census had been adjusted for the federal apportionment to correct the differ-
ential undercount, Arizona and California each would have gained one seat at the expense of 
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. See 56 Fed. Reg. 33,582, 33,601 (1991). 
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III.C.1 resp~nds to the objection that states should not use adjusted 
figures in redistricting because experts have failed to demonstrate 
conclusively the DSE's superiority on the block level. Section 
III.C.2 counters critics who maintain that it makes little sense to 
attempt to correct the undercount problem on a state-by-state basis, 
rather than on the national level. Finally, section III.C.3 addresses 
the concern that, if the Department of Commerce refuses to release 
adjusted data, the Freedom of Information Act might prove insuffi-
cient to force the disclosure of adjusted block data. 
1. The Relevance of Inconclusive Substate Findings 
Some critics may argue that states should not use adjusted data 
in their redistricting - a process that necessarily involves numer-
ous, complex decisions based on block-level data - because statis-
ticians cannot prove the superiority of the adjusted census .figures 
on the block level. These opponents would maintain that, given the 
uncertainty about the quality of adjustment, prudence dictates an 
adherence to the unadjusted enumeration and that a decision to use 
post-facto statistical adjustments would undermine the integrity of 
both the census and the redistricting process. 
This position mistakenly presumes that an alternative data set 
must be definitively better on all levels to supplant the actual 
enumeration. The Constitution requires that states use the best 
data available.123 The DSE is clearly a better data set on the na-
tional and state level.124 Furthermore, there is no persuasive evi-
dence to suggest that the unadjusted census is more accurate on 
substate levels. If the census were demonstrably better on the sub-
state level and the DSE demonstrably better on the state and na-
tional level, then there might be compelling arguments in favor of 
the status quo, but this is not the case. Redistricting is a substate 
process and so this ambiguity is unfortunate, but, ultimately, states 
must choose between data that are demonstrably better on several 
levels and data that are demonstrably better on no level. Article I, 
Section 2's requirement of population equality demands that states 
select the data set more likely to approximate best the true popula-
tion - the adjusted census.125 
2. The Consequences of a State-by-State Approach 
Other critics might question further the wisdom of approaching 
the problem of undercount-based vote dilution on a state-by-state 
123. See supra section III.A. 
124. See supra sections I.C.1, I.C.2. 
125. Recall the spirit and substance of the Court's admonition that "[a]s between two 
standards - equality or something less than equality - only the former reflects the aspira-
tions of Art. I,§ 2." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983). 
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basis. They might argue that this piecemeal strategy is a peculiar 
remedy to a national problem and will create a bizarre situation 
where some states redistrict with adjusted figures, while their neigh-
bors redistrict with official figures. 
Although undercount-based vote dilution affects people 
throughout the nation, it remains a state problem because of state 
legislatures' plenary power over the redistricting process. In the ab-
sence of federal legislation requiring the Secretary of Commerce to 
produce an accurate census, a national approach cannot work on 
account of the decentralized operation of the several state legisla-
tures.126 Undercounted groups, therefore, must bring actions 
against their particular state legislature in an effort to force it to use 
the best data available. 
Aesthetics aside, there are simply no negative consequences 
arising from a patchwork use of adjusted figures. No state's redis-
tricting depends on the redistricting policy of its neighbors - each 
state acts independently. Therefore, a state's use of a particular 
data set would never influence another state's practice, and so one 
state's use of adjusted data would not affect its neighboring states. 
One might find an imbalance when one state's voters become free 
from vote dilution while another state's population continues to 
suffer from undercounting, but surely the solution to that "inequal-
ity" is to extend the benefits of the adjusted count, not to maintain 
a system that systematically harms minorities and renters in all 
states.127 In short, the Constitution requires equality. If plaintiffs 
prove that the DSE's estimate of the true population in a given 
state is more accurate than the official census's estimate, then that 
state must use the DSE because the people have a right to election 
districts based on the best population data available. 
3. The Ability of Plaintiffs To Recover Block Data Under the 
Freedom of Information Act 
A skeptic additionally might argue that, while states must use 
the "best population data available" in congressional redistricting, 
they do not have ready access to adjusted census data and that re-
quiring them to obtain or create these data would burden unduly 
them. If the Department of Commerce has adjusted statistically the 
enumeration and agrees to turn over block-level data to the states, 
then this objection collapses. In response to the Florida legisla-
ture's request that the Secretary turn over adjusted data for redis-
tricting purposes, however, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the 
Department can refuse to turn over such data, on the grounds that 
126. See supra section II.A. 
127. See supra note 125. 
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the information falls under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA),128 known as the "deliberative process privi-
lege."129 On the other hand, courts in two other circuits have ruled 
to the contrary, arguing that release of block-level data would trig-
ger neither element of Exemption s.130 
The Supreme Court has construed the "deliberative process 
privilege" to protect documents that are both "predecisional" and 
"deliberative."131 "Predecisional" information is information that 
has been "prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in 
arriving at his decision,~'132 whereas "deliberative" information re-
flects the "decision making processes of government agencies" and 
generally includes "advisory opinions, recommendations and delib-
erations comprising part of a process by which governmental deci-
sions and policies are formulated."133 Furthermore, because FOIA 
seeks to expedite the disclosure of government documents, the 
Court has interpreted its exemptions narrowly.134 
The narrow exception to FOIA defined by the Supreme Court 
should not apply to block-level data. Actual adjusted census data 
do not constitute "predecisional" information because the integrity 
of the statistical formulae, not the actual data themselves, allegedly 
affected the Secretary's decision.135 If the Secretary's protestations 
that he did not consider which states and groups specifically would 
gain voting power are true,136 then the actual figures had nothing to 
do with his decision not to adjust the official numbers. Conse-
quently, the data fail to qualify as "predecisional." Nor do the ad-
justed figures constitute "deliberative" information because they 
themselves do not constitute an agency's or individual's recommen-
128. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1994). 
129. See Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 961 F.2d · 
941, 950 (11th Cir.), cerL dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 446 (1992). 
130. See Assembly of State v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 921-23 
(9th Cir.1992); City of New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 930-
31 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
131. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engg. Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 186 (1975). 
132. 421 U.S. at 184. 
133. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (citations omitted). 
134. See Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Department of Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976). 
135. See Assembly of State v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 921 (9th 
Cir. 1992). . 
136. Secretary Mosbacher stated: 
What is unsettling, however, is that the choice of the adjustment method selected by 
Bureau officials can make a difference in apportionment, and the political outcome of 
that choice can be known in advance. I am confident that political considerations played 
no role in the Census Bureau's choice of an adjustment model for the 1990 census. I am 
deeply concerned, however, that adjustment would open the door to political tampering 
with the census in the future. The outcome of the enumeration process cannot be di-
rectly affected in such a way. 
56 Fed. Reg. 33,582, 33,583 (1991). 
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dation but rather are the products of an alternative population 
enumeration process.131 
Even if the courts rule that the Department of Commerce does 
not have to release adjusted data to the states, plaintiffs still may 
prevail. The Wesberry-Kirkpatrick-Karcher line of cases require 
that states use the "best population data available" for the construc-
tion of congressional districts. The meaning of this standard, in 
large part, turns on the definition of "available," which can mean 
both "capable of being used" or "accessible."138 If the Department 
of Commerce agrees to release or must release adjusted data, then 
under either definition, individual states must use these data if 
courts find that they best represent the population. Even if the De-
partment withholds an adjusted census, however, courts still may 
require states to conduct their own statistical adjustment under the 
second meaning of "available," given the existence of a demonstra-
bly superior methodology. Although ordinarily courts may hesitate 
to dictate state policy, they ought to interpret broadly the com-
mands of the Wesberry-Kirkpatrick-Karcher line of cases and ex-
tend this positive duty to the states because the right at stake -
equal representation in Congress, guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 
- is so central to the integrity of the republic.139 
Critics also might contend that, even when presented with ex-
tant contending data sets, courts will find it difficult to evaluate the 
altematives.140 The accuracy of adjusted figures for each state un-
doubtedly will be the subject of intensive, complex litigation, and, 
until the Supreme Court endorses a specific methodology, the re-
sults and character of that litigation will vary because of the difficul-
ties caused by diverse statistical procedures and the absence of a 
scientific united front.141 Article I, Section 2 and the principles ex-
137. The Supreme Court established that a "flexible, common-sense approach" requires a 
determination of where information falls on the spectrum between the "purely factual" and 
"law, policy, or opinion." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973). Furthermore, Congress 
sought, through Exemption 5, to relieve agencies from the specter of operating "in a 
fishbowl" - an environment that would chill the free exchange of ideas and thus damage the 
quality of the decisionmaking process. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). 
The data themselves do not reveal any information about the processes that went into the 
Secretary's decisionmaking and therefore cannot fall under the "deliberative-process" 
exemption. 
138. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 128 (2d ed. 1983). 
139. States may object that a positive duty to adjust for the differential undercount would 
place upon them a significant financial and institutional burden. This may be so, but the 
people's interest in equal representation far outweighs the state's interest in parsimony. 
140. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1419 (7th Cir.) 
("The dispositive consideration in this case is that, though even the fine points of statistical 
methodology can have real consequences, a case about statistical methodology is a case 
whose gears fail to mesh with any judicially enforceable federal rights."), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 407 (1992). 
141. See generally supra section J.C. 
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pounded in Wesberry, Kirkpatrick, and Karcher demand, however, 
that courts rigorously evaluate the relative strength of competing 
figures and actively apply those findings in the redistricting context. 
CONCLUSION 
Should the Supreme Court reverse the Second Circuit's decision 
in City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce,142 it 
would bring to an end current efforts to ameliorate the census un-
dercount by suing federal officials. If this result proves to be the 
death knell for challenges to the differential undercount, America's 
constitutional structure will have proven unable to fulfill its promise 
of "one person, one vote." Ultimately, therefore, someone must 
take responsibility for the differential undercount. This responsibil-
ity properly rests with the state governments, for they indepen-
dently make the redistricting decisions that translate the Census 
Bureau's faulty enumeration into a palpable marginalization of un-
derrepresented peoples. Plaintiffs who suffer from undercount re-
lated vote dilution, therefore, should challenge their state's 
delineation of congressional districts when their legislature uses un-
adjusted census figures. Such litigation would end our long, shame-
ful history of race- and class-based oppression by means of unequal 
representation and would ensure that each member of the polity 
would have an equal opportunity to participate in our representa-
tive democracy - America's great experiment. 
142. 34 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995). 
